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1. Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Keynote Address at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Patent Policy Conference: Role of U.S. Patent Policy in Domestic Innovation and Potential Impacts
on Investment (Apr. 11, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarksdirector-andrei-iancu-us-chamber-commerce-patent-policy-conference).
2. Instradent USA, Inc. v. ITC, 693 F. App’x 908 (Fed Cir. 2017) (Nobel Biocare was the patent-holder and
second-named appellee in this case. This Comment focuses on patent-holders and refers to this case and the next
as the Nobel Biocare cases).
3. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
4. U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Id.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
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In April 2018, the director of the United States Patent & Trademark Office, Andrei
Iancu, stated, “the patent grant is less reliable today than it should be.”1 For Nobel Biocare,
owner of United States Patent 8,714,977 (‘977 patent), the United States patent system
became the antithesis of reliability. In two separate appellate court decisions, only fourteen
months apart, the ‘977 patent was found to be valid, then unpatentable. On July 19, 2017,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission
(ITC) ruling, upholding the validity of the ‘977 patent.2 On September 13, 2018, the same
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the United States Patent & Trademark
Office’s (USPTO) Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) ruling, regarding the same patent,
relying on virtually the same evidence, upholding the unpatentability of the ‘977 patent.3
This Comment explores recent developments in the patent system that set the stage for this
absurd result, analyzes sources of conflict in the law that doom the patent system to repeat
this problem, and argues for changes to harmonize the patent system and increase the
reliability of the patent grant.
The first section of this Comment provides a brief review of the history of the United
States’ patent system and how recent changes to its statutory design created the perfect
storm of conditions, which have led to inconsistent results such as those found in the Nobel
Biocare cases. The Founding Fathers intended that the patent system promote innovation
through the grant of exclusive rights to inventors.4 An inventor would submit an idea,
striking a bargain whereby he shared it with the world, and in turn, received a patent—an
exclusive right to the use of his invention.5 These patents had all of the same attributes as
property, such as recordation, transferability, 6 and the right to prevent another from
trespassing by making or using patented technology without the patent holder’s
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permission.7 Fast forward to the year 2012 and the passage of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, which created the USPTO’s PTAB and, with it, a new post-grant review
process entitled inter partes review.8 The goal of inter partes review proceedings was twofold: (1) to help weed out weak patents that should not have been granted by the USPTO
in the first place and (2) to lower costs and increase the efficiency of patent suits by
avoiding district court proceedings.9 The constitutionality of inter partes review was
initially challenged, but on April 24, 2018, the United States Supreme Court announced
its decision in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, which
upheld the constitutionality of the inter partes review process, but only narrowly. 10
Ultimately, this section of the Comment reveals that patents should be considered personal
property and regarded with the same respect and rights afforded to other forms of property
the government secures.
The second section of this Comment identifies and analyzes Congress’ statutory
drafting that led to the conflicting results in the Nobel Biocare cases,11 and explains why
the Supreme Court decided Oil States on such a narrow basis.12 This tension originates
from a fundamental difference in the way patent grants are conceptualized—patentability
as opposed to validity—and from a loophole in the America Invents Act that allows
defendants in infringement lawsuits to circumvent the protections guaranteed to patents.
Congress conflated these two sides of the same coin by increasing uncertainty for all
involved, creating a lop-sided patent prosecution process, and contributing to the United
States patent system tumbling from number one in the world to a tie for twelfth place in
six years.13
The final section of this Comment identifies potential solutions to the problems
created by the America Invents Act’s confusion between patentability and validity. The
first solution addresses a constitutional challenge to inter partes review based on the
Takings Clause as invited by Oil States.14 The second solution, also invited by the Oil

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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7. § 271(a).
8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 311, 125 Stat. 284, 299, 313 (2011).
9. Sasha Moss, Charles Duan & Joe Kane, Inter Partes Review as a Means to Improve Patent Quality, R
STREET (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.rstreet.org/2017/09/25/inter-partes-review-as-a-means-to-improve-patentquality/.
10. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1368–70 (2018).
11. Instradent USA, Inc. v. ITC, 693 Fed. Appx. 908 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent
USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
12. 138 S. Ct. at 1379.
13. MEIR PUGATCH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.: G LOB . INTELLECTUAL PROP . CTR., MEASURING
MOMENTUM: GIPC INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 26 (1st ed. Dec. 2012), https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/GIPC_Index_Report2012.pdf; MEIR PUGATCH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.: G LOB.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., THE ROOTS OF I NNOVATION: U.S. CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP I NDEX 117 (5th ed.
Feb.
2017),
https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2017_Report.pdf; MEIR PUGATCH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.:
GLOB . INTELLECTUAL PROP. C TR., CREATE: U.S. C HAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 35 (6th ed. Feb. 2018),
https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf; MEIR PUGATCH ET
AL., U.S. C HAMBER OF COM.: GLOB . INTELLECTUAL PROP . CTR., INSPIRING T OMORROW: U.S. CHAMBER
INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 44 (7th ed. Feb. 2019), https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/023593_GIPC_IP_Index_2019_Full_04.pdf.
14. 138 S. Ct. at 1379.
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States decision,15 presents a due process challenge to the constitutionality of the same
statutory language under factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge.16 The third potential
solution identified is the ability of the Director of the USPTO to address the issues.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the time bar loophole should be eliminated to avoid
an inherently thorny constitutional challenge and to delineate between unpatentability and
invalidity challenges against patents.
II. THE 2012 AMERICA INVENTS ACT INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCESS E VISCERATES THE
VALUE OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT GRANT

Id.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.; Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150–51.
Id.

05/15/2020 10:30:18

15.
16.
17.
18.
1375.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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The history of the United States’ patent system stretches back to the origins of the
nation.17 For more than 200 years, United States’ patent law protected the patent grant
with the same rights as personal property. In the last six years, legislative design and
judicial decisions have eroded the value of the patent grant by relegating the patent grant
to little more than that of a public franchise.18 This reduction in rights, in combination
with Congress’ creation of the inter partes review process, generates significant
uncertainty in the patent grant.
The founders of the United States memorialized the importance of patents, both to
the United States and to the individuals who choose to share their inventions, in the
supreme law of the land: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries . . . .”19 This quid pro quo is known as the bargain of the patent system.20
The preamble of this clause plainly sets forth the goal of the patent system, and with it, the
altruistic societal expectation of the bargain—to encourage scientific development through
the sharing of ideas.21 The subsequent clause identifies the compensation offered to
inventors for entering into this bargain—that they obtain a “foundational right to exclude
others from practice of the patented invention.”22 Looming in the background of the patent
bargain lies the indelible impact that disclosure of an idea leaves on both society and the
inventor. Once an inventor commits his idea to paper in the form of a patent application,
and the United States government begins the process of granting a patent in return, the
inventor no longer maintains exclusive control over his idea.23 The invention is made
public and laid bare for all the world to see.24
Throughout United States history, the patent grant received the same status and
esteem as any other piece of personal property. Over time, the legislative, executive, and
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judicial branches of the United States government endeavored to re-shape the patent
system in an effort to keep in step with changes in society and to combat “‘bad’ patents.”25
While some of these alterations have increased the efficiency of the system, other changes
have hampered its effectiveness and led to the gradual destruction of the rights guaranteed
in the grant of a patent. One such change is the implementation of the America Invents
Act and its creation of the inter partes review process.26 Although it was one of the most
prominent and crucial changes to patent law in recent history, it created a significant
loophole that diminished the value of the patent grant.
A. For More Than Two Centuries, United States’ Patent Law Preserved Patent Grants
as Full-Fledged Property Rights

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

25. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 113 (2011).
26. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 311, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
27. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 621 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
28. U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. Id.
30. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197 (1857); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S.
315 (1888); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999); Evans
v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872 (Va. Cir. 1813).
31. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
33. § 271(a).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Bar
Association Inaugural Texas Dinner (Oct. 18, 2018) (“The only time the word ‘right’ appears was to secure
intellectual property rights. It was that important to our founders. And they were right.”) (transcript available at
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-eastern-district-texas-bar-associationinaugural-texas).

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 107 Side A

The founding fathers foresaw the importance of individual innovation to the
country’s advancement and thus, endeavored to protect those inventors who shared their
knowledge with the world.27 The patent system they established more than two hundred
years ago continues to exist today as a means to promote technological advancement and
to protect those who invest their time, money, and resources to research and develop those
technological advancements.
Much like the United States Constitution that gave it life, the patent system is a
living, breathing institution—full of lofty ideals and subject to enormous scrutiny—which
evolves to address the issues in contemporary society. The United States Constitution
guarantees inventors “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”28
This right, “secur[ed] for limited [t]imes” by the United States government to the inventor,
is at the core of the patent system.29 Two hundred years of case law consistently held that
patent grants equate to property rights.30 Additionally, the statutes governing the United
States patent system, including the recent revisions made by the America Invents Act,31
ordain the patent grant with the presumption of validity32 and the attributes of personal
property. 33
The drafters chose to use the words “exclusive Right” when communicating the
essence of the patent system.34 This choice was no mistake nor mere happenstance35—it
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36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (The word “right” appears throughout the amendments to the constitution).
37. ROBERT E. WRIGHT, ONE NATION UNDER DEBT: HAMILTON, JEFFERSON, AND THE HISTORY OF WHAT
WE OWE 11 (2008).
38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Martha Jefferson Carr (Mar. 28, 1787), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 371, 373 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1894).
39. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150. (1989).
40. Id. at 149.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 94 (1902) (indicating contract containing an exclusive
license is in accordance with Congress’ statutes); Woodbridge v United States, 263 U.S. 50, 55–56 (1923);
Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378–79 (1945) (indicating “failure of patentee to make use of patented
invention does not affect validity of patent”); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945).
44. See cases cited supra note 43.
45. Marshall Phelps, Do Patents Really Promote Innovation? A Response to The Economist, FORBES (Sept.
16, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marshallphelps/2015/09/16/do-patents-really-promote-innovation-aresponse-to-the-economist/#4ec5bae81921.
46. Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium, 26 INT’ L J. INDUS . ORG. 1153, 1173 (2007).
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was by design. The word “Right” only appears once in the body of the Constitution, and
it specifically relates to the guarantee of sole ownership of the works created by inventors
and writers when they publish their ideas for all the world to see. 36 The founding fathers
recognized the grave circumstances in which they were operating. The United States was
a fledgling country, “essentially bankrupt” and “hurting economically.” 37 Thomas
Jefferson understood this. In a letter to his sister, Martha Jefferson Carr, dated March 28,
1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “we are obliged to invent and execute; to find means within
ourselves, and not to lean on others.”38 He knew that for America to survive—let alone
thrive—the government needed to stimulate innovation. America needed to spur the great
minds of the time to develop new ideas and share those ideas with their fellow citizens.
America needed to reward those great minds for their efforts to contribute to the greater
good of society at large so that the American dream we take for granted today could
become a reality.
Central to the design of the patent system is a “carefully crafted bargain.”39 It is a
quid pro quo wherein inventors are given explicit encouragement to share their knowledge,
ideas, and inventions with the world, and in return the government secures for the inventor
a patent monopoly.40 Thus, the patent system creates a symbiotic relationship between
society and the inventor. In the exchange, the inventor fully discloses his invention.41
Inventors reveal their discovery to the world to expand the knowledge of the community
as a whole and propel humanity forward. In return, the government provides an exclusive
right specific to that invention.42 The exclusive right creates a monopoly in which the
holder of the patent can either manufacture the item covered by the patented technology,
license the technology to others, or do nothing with it at all.43 The right is the inventor’s
and the inventor’s alone.44 This exclusive right encourages “ex ante innovation—meaning,
they induce people to invent because of the prospect of profiting from those inventions.”45
Firms that obtain patents “earn on average a 50% premium over” firms that do not obtain
patents.46 As a result, other inventors are further emboldened to study the patents, learn
from them, and improve upon them. As Isaac Newton said, “If I have seen further it is by
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standing on the shoulders of giants.”47
Early jurisprudence recognized the grant of a patent as synonymous with a property
right.48 For instance, in an 1813 circuit court decision, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote
that the inventor, “from the moment of the invention,” obtains an “inchoate property
therein.”49 A property that is “exclusive”; a property that is “secure[d] to the inventor”; a
property that is “indefeasible,” which “commences with the discovery itself,” and only
after it has been discovered and disclosed, is “perfected by the patent.”50 In 1857, the
Supreme Court wrote, “by the laws of the United States, the rights of a party under a patent
are his private property.”51 In 1876, the Supreme Court stated, “[a] patent for an invention
is as much property as a patent for land.”52 In 1888, the Supreme Court held that “[t]his is
property, property of a value so large that nobody has been able to estimate it,” and this
property in the form of a patent grant is the “exclusive right [of] the patentee.”53 In 1985,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals wrote, “It is beyond reasonable debate that patents
are property.”54 Both the Brown v. Duchesne and Consolidated Fruit Jar v. Wright cases
were cited in a 1999 case in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[p]atents . . . have
long been considered a species of property.”55 This bedrock principle has long been held
by the judiciary. Patent grants and the rights associated with them are important, valuable,
and appointed with the same entitlements as personal property.
Following the early common law developments surrounding patents as personal
property, Congress agreed with the judiciary, enacting the Patent Act of 1952. In section
261 of that Act, Congress wrote, “patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”56
The modern-day legislature confirmed the historical holdings of the judiciary. In 35 U.S.C.
§ 261—the same section—Congress again codified “patents shall have the attributes of
personal property.”57 For more than two centuries, United States’ patent law treated patent
grants as full-fledged property rights. The legislature ratified the judiciary’s interpretation,
codifying the importance of the patent grant, its value, and the level of protection afforded
to each grant.

05/15/2020 10:30:18

C M
Y K

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 108 Side A

47. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (on file with Historical Society of
Pennsylvania).
48. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (Va. Cir. 1813); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197
(1857); Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315,
370 (1888).
49. Evans, 8 F. Cas. at 873.
50. Id.
51. Brown, 60 U.S. at 197.
52. Consol. Fruit-Jar Co., 94 U.S. at 96.
53. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 370.
54. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
55. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (citing
Brown, 60 U.S. 183; Consol. Fruit-Jar Co., 94 U.S. 96).
56. Patent Law Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 261).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
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B. The 2012 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Created the Inter Partes Review Process
Which Cancels Issued Patents at an Alarming Rate
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Y K
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58. David Goldman, Patent Reform Is Finally on Its Way, CNN MONEY (June 24, 2011),
https://money.cnn.com/2011/06/24/technology/patent_reform_bill/index.htm; Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
59. H.R. REP. N O. 112-98, pt. 1, at 20 (2011); 35 U.S.C. § 316(c) (2012).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45–47.
61. Id. at 40.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
63. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018).
64. Id.
65. § 311(c)(1).
66. § 311(b).
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In 2011, Congress passed into law the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, bringing
with it some of the most significant changes to United States’ patent law since the Patent
Act of 1952.58 The America Invents Act formed the newly minted Patent Trial and Appeal
Board while simultaneously revising and expanding a number of post-patent-grant
opposition procedures.59 These post-grant procedures preserved ex parte reexamination,
created post-grant review, and converted inter partes reexamination to an adjudicative
proceeding, renaming it inter partes review.60 The inter partes review process allows third
parties to challenge the USPTO’s decision to grant a patent as an added layer of quality
control and error correction.61 Although these third party challenges are intended to
increase the efficiency of the patent system and the quality of the issued patents, these
challenges frequently end in a finding of unpatentability at a distressing rate, resulting in
the cancellation of patents. This ultimately undermines the finality of any patent grant.
Under the America Invents Act, a third party may challenge a patent by filing a
“petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”62 Once instituted, an inter partes
review proceeds in a very similar fashion to that of traditional district court litigation. The
third-party petitioner and patent holder engage in motion practice, discovery may be
sought by the parties, depositions may be taken, witnesses may be cross-examined, and
evidence may be introduced pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 63 Further, the
language of the USPTO indicates similarities between inter partes review and typical
litigation. For instance, the USPTO refers to the adversarial oral argument before the
PTAB as a “trial,” the members of the PTAB that decide the matter “judges,” and the final
written decision handed down as a “judgment.”64
The inter partes review process which the PTAB oversees is intended to allow
members of the public a short period in which they can bring narrow challenges to the
issuance of a patent based on prior art that the USPTO may have overlooked during its
review and granting process. The statute of limitations confined the time frame for
petitions to be brought to the nine months following the grant of a patent.65 The challenges
are limited to “request[s] to cancel 1 or more claim of a patent only on a ground that could
be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents
or printed publications.”66 The statute also includes strict estoppel language precluding a
petitioner, real party in interest, or privy from challenging the same patent claims before
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the PTAB on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised.”67
Even with the stringent standards in place, the inter partes review process has been
extremely popular among individual petitioners and defendants in patent infringement
suits. In October 2013, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader called the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board “death squads, kind of killing property rights.”68 The USPTO’s own
statistics indicate that as of September 30, 2015, just three years after the enactment of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 575 final written decisions from inter partes review
proceedings were handed down.69 Eighty-seven percent of all patents challenged in an
inter partes review trial between the enactment of the bill and September 30, 2015, were
found to be unpatentable with regard to all or some of their claims.70 The current statistics
do not paint a different picture. As of September 30, 2018, fully eighty percent of all claims
were found unpatentable in some regard.71 Of the 2,268 final written decisions handed
down in inter partes review since its formation, as well as post-grant review proceedings
and covered business method proceedings, 1,888 of them found some or all of the
challenged claims unpatentable.72 At best, these staggering statistics indicate that the
USPTO has quality control issues that need to be addressed. At worst, third parties abuse
the system by challenging already issued patents in a forum that costs less, proceeds more
quickly, and has lower standards than district court proceedings. Either way, the inter
partes review process leads to the cancellation of already issued patents at an alarming
rate.
C. The Supreme Court’s Oil States Decision Misconstrues the Patent Property Right to
That of a Public Franchise
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67. § 315(e)(1).
68. Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-not-totally-off-base-chief-says.
69. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 9 (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-30%20PTAB.pdf.
70. Id.
71. PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR,
CGM 11 (July 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20180731.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018).
74. Id. at 1370.
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In April 2018, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Oil
States Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC. The Court held that
Congress’ creation of the inter partes review process as part of the 2012 Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act was indeed constitutional. In so doing, it also construed the patent
grant as a public franchise.73 The Supreme Court’s holding that patents are not personal
property, but rather are consigned to that of a public franchise, severely misconstrues the
historical record to the detriment of patent holders, ultimately devaluing the patent grant
and hampering innovation.
The Court explains that “Congress has created administrative processes that
authorize the [US]PTO to reconsider and cancel patent claims that were wrongly issued.” 74
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Id. at 1374.
Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1379.
Id. (emphasis added).
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1372 (emphasis added).
Id.
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While technically correct as to the inter partes review process itself, this holding fails to
take into account the entire course of challenges that unfold in practice. The Court
established that if an agency grants a right to an individual, the agency has the power to
take that right away.75 In other words, the public-rights doctrine—under which Congress
can prescribe adjudication of claims to an administrative agency—applies76 and inter
partes review fits neatly within that doctrine.77 The Court stated that “the decision to grant
a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise.”78
In so holding, the Court wrote that inter partes review is limited to a reassessment of the
USPTO’s grant of the patent in the first place. In its reading of the statute, the Court held
that Congress “reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration. Thus, the
PTO can do so without violating Article III.”79
This reconsideration may be permissible as it relates to the initial grant of a patent.
It should not and cannot extend to the entire lifetime of the patent. Expanding this avenue
of challenge beyond the initial grant of the patent and applying it to the entire lifetime of
the patent effectively ensures that a patent right never truly vests. The title to the granted
property is never fully quieted and it is subjected to a standard of review that flies in the
face of two-hundred-plus years of judicial precedent and statutory protection. This result
conflates the intent of the inter partes review process—to correct patents granted in error—
with the adjudication and protection of rights proscribed to Article III courts.
Yet, the Court was careful to “emphasize the narrowness of [its] holding.”80 The
Court only addressed the “constitutionality of inter partes review,” and limited its review
to “only the precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised.”81 That specific
challenge was described by the Court as “whether inter partes review violates Article
III.”82 This issue could easily, yet incorrectly, be mistaken to read that inter partes review
does not violate Article III in every instance. While it is true that the Court held that inter
partes review does not violate Article III of the Constitution, it did so only as to the
authority of the United States government to cancel patent claims that were wrongly
issued—a process that results in a finding of unpatentability. 83 To that end, the Court was
correct that the inter partes review process is valid and constitutional because the core of
the process is indeed similar to other constitutional processes already in place within the
USPTO. However, when extended beyond the initial grant of a patent, the rationale of the
holding and the constitutionality of the process begin to unravel.
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III. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE GOVERNING THE INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCESS
CIRCUMVENTS THE AUTHORITY OF ARTICLE III COURTS AND PRODUCES ABSURD
RESULTS FOR PATENT HOLDERS
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84. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
85. Jason E. Stach & Jeffrey A. Freeman, District Court or the PTO: Choosing Where to Litigate Patent
Invalidity, FINNEGAN (Mar./Apr. 2014), https://www.ﬁnnegan.com/en/insights/district-court-or-the-ptochoosing-where-to-litigate-patent.html.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
88. § 282(b)(2).
89. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
90. § 316(e).
91. § 271(a).
92. Id.
93. § 261.
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Congress intended the America Invents Act to incorporate new processes and
procedures to “streamline[]” the patent system by making it more efficient, while
simultaneously “improv[ing] patent quality,” by allowing third parties to assist the USPTO
with quality control through unpatentability challenges. 84 It is true that the inter partes
review process ultimately concludes faster than a district court would under the same or
similar circumstances. It is also true that the inter partes review process is less expensive
for alleged infringers than traditional litigation.85 However, patent holders bear the true
cost—both tangible and intangible. The America Invents Act’s statutory design creates a
loophole for defendants in patent infringement suits.
Federal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction over cases “arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents.”86 When patent holders believe that another entity utilizes
their patented technology without permission, the patent holder may file a lawsuit alleging
that the defendant is infringing on the patent holder’s rights.87 In an infringement suit, a
defendant may then plead the affirmative defense of invalidity, claiming that a patent
should not have been granted by the USPTO in the first place.88 Because a patent is
“presumed valid” under the America Invents Act, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision, held that defendants must prove their invalidity defense by a clear and convincing
standard.89 The loophole created in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) allows a defendant in a patent
infringement suit to challenge the validity of a patent at virtually any time during a patent’s
life, unshackled from the Article III judicial system, and subject to a far more favorable
burden of proof—preponderance of the evidence.90 This loophole conflates the concept of
patentability—the process of issuing a patent and performing error correction, with
validity—the process of challenging a patent as an affirmative defense in litigation.
Traditionally, a patent holder identifies a company allegedly using the patented
technology without permission.91 The patent holder then files suit against that company
for patent infringement,92 which is similar to the real property concept of trespass. A patent
holder owns the technology that he claims to have invented in the form of an issued
patent.93 The claims of a patent are like the borders of a piece of real property. The patent
holder has an exclusive right to his claimed invention, and unauthorized users of that
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Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 196 (1857).
§ 284.
§ 282(a).
§ 273(b).
564 U.S. 91, 113–14 (2011).
Id. at 112 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)).
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 50 (2011).
MPEP § 2001(b)(3) (9th ed., Jan. 2018).
35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
§ 311(c).
§ 282(a).
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invention are infringers, just like unauthorized persons on land are trespassers.94
Therefore, patent owners may sue for damages “to compensate for the infringement, but
in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”95
One possible argument against infringement is an affirmative defense in which the
defendant may attempt to prove the invalidity of the patent—arguing that the patent cannot
be infringed because it should not have been issued by the USPTO in the first place.
Because the United States government granted the patent, because it is a property right,
and because the affirmative defense purports to strip the plaintiff of a property right, the
legislature and the judiciary afford a high level of protection to the patent grant. Thus, 35
U.S.C. § 282(a) commands that an issued patent “shall be presumed valid,”96 and 35
U.S.C. § 273 states that “[a] person asserting a defense under this section shall have the
burden of establishing the defense by clear and convincing evidence.” 97 The Supreme
Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Parnership upheld this requirement of proving
invalidity by a clear and convincing standard.98 In a unanimous decision, the Court noted
this “heightened standard of proof is an essential component of the patent ‘bargain.’”99
However, the America Invents Act’s statutory design as it relates to the inter partes
review process changes the dynamics of this challenge significantly. First and foremost,
the inter partes review process is focused on correcting errors made by the USPTO during
its review of a patent application leading up to the point in time that the patent ultimately
issues.100 The USPTO determines the patentability of an invention during its examinations
under a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.101 Congress’ statutory design in
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act compels the PTAB to utilize the same
preponderance of the evidence standard in the inter partes review process.102 The LeahySmith America Invents Act’s language limits a third party challenge to the patentability of
an invention to a nine month period following the grant of the patent.103 This statute of
limitations appears to comport with the statutory language which commands that an issued
“patent shall be presumed valid.”104 The statute provides third parties with a short period
in which they may challenge the patentability of a patent under inter partes review to assist
the USPTO with quality control, while ultimately vesting property rights and protecting
the issued patent.
Nevertheless, a loophole exists in the language of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act allowing a defendant in a lawsuit to petition to institute an inter partes review up to
“[one] year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the
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petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”105 This
effectively allows a defendant in a patent infringement suit—regardless of the point in
time in which the suit is brought—a choice between venues in which to challenge the grant
of a patent. The first option for a defendant is to proceed with the affirmative defense of
invalidity in a district court under a clear and convincing standard, with the increasing
likelihood that the case will be heard by a jury. 106 The second option allows a defendant
to sidestep these requirements. Instead, the party may elect to challenge the patentability
of a patent in inter partes review in front of an administrative panel, without a jury, under
the lower and easier to meet preponderance of the evidence standard.107 While the
defendant in an infringement suit gets the option to choose the line of attack, the patent
holder is subject to exposure on two fronts. This produces absurd results for a patent holder
because it guarantees that the taxes paid to maintain the patent and the ultimate death of
the patent grant are the only rights that the government truly secures for the patent holder.
A. Article III Proceedings Provide Considerable Protection to Patent Grants
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105. § 315.
106. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND COOPERS & LYBRAND, 2017 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 1, 6 (May 2017),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2017-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
107. § 316(e); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
109. U.S. CONST. amend V.
110. § 282(a).
111. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 112–14 (2011); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136
S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
112. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
113. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219 (2015) (citing The Federalist No. 78, 467
(Alexander Hamilton)).
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United States patent law secures for inventors their exclusive rights to their property
in the form of a patent grant.108 Once property rights are secured, the United States
Constitution declares that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”109 Article III district courts ensure the protection of those secured rights
by adhering to the statutory language endowing patents with a presumption of validity,110
and by requiring defendants to prove the invalidity of a patent by a clear and convincing
standard.111
Judicial independence is a hallmark of the United States’ justice system that is
“sometimes take[n] for granted.”112 However, the independence of the judiciary is of
critical importance to the preservation of constitutionally protected rights. The Article III
court system “act[s] as ‘an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority.’”113 Congress understood the importance of judicial independence and
committed patent rights and related controversies explicitly to the original jurisdiction of
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Article III courts.114
The judicial branch provides considerable protection to the property rights
associated with the grant of a patent. In Cuozzo Speed, the Supreme Court stated that a
defendant in an infringement suit “must prove invalidity by ‘clear and convincing
evidence.’”115 The Supreme Court in Commil USA added that this standard is a “high bar”
to overcome. 116 For almost thirty years, the Federal Circuit has held that the clear and
convincing standard is appropriate.117 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, the
Supreme Court pointed out this burden is appropriate even in infringement suits in which
the defendant’s invalidity contentions include evidence not previously considered by the
USPTO.118 Furthermore, Congress itself “codif[ied] the common-law presumption of
patent validity and, implicitly, the heightened standard of proof attached to it.”119
1. The Common Law, Statutory Language, and Administrative Rules All Endow
Patents with a Presumption of Validity
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114. 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
115. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144.
116. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (2015).
117. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 113 (2011).
118. Id. at 108–12.
119. Id. at 108.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
121. 35 U.S.C. (referencing Part III titled, “Patents and Protection of Patent Rights”).
122. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 35 U.S.C. §
282(a) (originally enacted as The Patent Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812).
123. § 282(a).
124. Id.
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The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, written and passed by Congress in 2012
states, “[a] patent shall be presumed valid.”120 This categorical, unqualified, general
statement appears in Title 35 of the United States Code under Part III entitled, “Patents
and Protection of Patent Rights.”121 Congress’ statutory mandate takes into account the
importance of patent rights to individuals, that struggle to create the patented technology,
placing the burden of proving invalidity of a patent or a claim on the party asserting the
defense of invalidity.
The presumption of validity originated in the common law, and Congress codified
the presumption in section 282 of The Patent Act of 1952.122 As originally written, the
entirety of section 282 reads as follows: “A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on the party asserting it.”123 The passage of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2012 did nothing to change the core presumption
found in section 282 of The Patent Act of 1952. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
retained the same section number and expounded on the presumption, extending it to not
just the patent itself, but each claim within the patent; notwithstanding the fact that the
claims may depend on another invalid claim.124
Following its codification, various levels of the court system endorsed the
presumption of patent validity. In its discussion of legal standards as applied to summary
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judgment, the Northern District of California wrote “[p]atents are presumed valid,”
referencing 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).125 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated,
“[t]o summarize on this point, § 282 creates a presumption that a patent is valid and
imposes the burden of proving invalidity on the attacker.”126 In another case, the Federal
Circuit wrote, “Section 282 plainly states that a patent’s claims are presumed valid
independent of one another.”127 Finally, the Supreme Court held that “[b]y its express
terms, § 282 establishes a presumption of patent validity, and it provides that a challenger
must overcome that presumption to prevail on an invalidity defense.”128
In addition, the USPTO explains the importance of the presumption of validity
within its Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).129 In section 1701, the MPEP
is clear: “Every patent is presumed to be valid. See 35 U.S.C. 282, first sentence.”130 It
further states that “[i]t is important for an examiner to properly communicate the basis for
a rejection . . . . Since issued patents are presumed valid131 and constitute a property
right,132 the written record must be clear as to the basis for the grant.”133
All three branches of government agree that patents are guaranteed the presumption
of validity. The presumption of validity protects the guarantee of property rights in the
form of a patent grant.134 The judiciary created the presumption through judge-made law,
Congress saw fit to enshrine the presumption in the laws of the United States, and the
USPTO recognizes the presumption in its manual which governs the execution of its
duties.
2. Proving Patent Invalidity Requires a Showing by a Clear and Convincing
Standard
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125. Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113917, at *13
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2014) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)).
126. Am. Hoist, & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1360.
127. ArcelorMittal Fr. v. AK Steel Corp., 786 F.3d 885, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
128. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 100 (2011).
129. MPEP §§ 706.02(j), 1701, 2003 (9th ed., Jan. 2018).
130. MPEP § 1701 (emphasis added).
131. MPEP § 706.02(j) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)) (internal citation omitted).
132. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261) (internal citation omitted).
133. Id.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
135. § 282(b)(2).
136. § 282(a).
137. § 273(b).
138. Guardian Indus. Corp. v. AFG Indus., No. 03-73722, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66978, at *36 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 19, 2006).
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Once the USPTO issues a patent and the patent holder asserts it in a lawsuit against
an alleged infringer, the infringer may raise an affirmative defense of invalidity of the
patent.135 As discussed above, once issued, patents are presumed valid.136 The
presumption of validity carries with it the burden that a defense of invalidity be proven by
“establishing the defense by clear and convincing evidence.”137 The clear and convincing
standard is “high,”138 falling in between “the usual civil law standard” of preponderance
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of the evidence, and “the criminal law standard of . . . guilt” beyond a reasonable doubt.139
The Supreme Court established the standard as early as 1934 when it upheld a patent
in a suit because the challenger had failed to establish his claims “by convincing
evidence.”140 More recently, in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, the Supreme Court
noted that the Federal Circuit has read the clear and convincing standard into section 282
of The Patent Act of 1952 since 1984.141 Further, the Microsoft Corp. Court stated that
since that 1984 decision in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., “the
Federal Circuit has never wavered in this interpretation.”142 Similarly, following the
passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act which replaced The Patent Act of 1952,
the Cuozzo Speed Court indicated, “in [a] district court, a challenger must prove invalidity
by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”143 The same standard of proving invalidity by clear
and convincing evidence existed prior to the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act in 2012 and it exists to this day.
B. The Article I Inter Partes Review Process Affords Challengers an Opportunity to
Sidestep the Protections of Article III District Court Proceedings

C M
Y K

05/15/2020 10:30:18

139. Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
140. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 7 (1934) (quoting Austin Machinery Co. v.
Buckeye Traction Ditcher Co., 13 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1926)) ("[T]he presumption of the validity of the patent
is such that the defense of invention by another must be established by the clearest proof—perhaps beyond
reasonable doubt.").
141. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011) (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
142. Id. at 98.
143. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (citing Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 95).
144. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1).
145. § 315(b).
146. § 154(a)(2).
147. Id. (establishing term of patent grant); § 271(a) (establishing right to claim of infringement of patent
grant); § 286 (establishing time limitation on damages).

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 112 Side B

The USPTO’s inter partes review process provides patent challengers with the
opportunity to circumvent the safeguards of district court proceedings. Any person—
whether involved in litigation over the patent or not—who wishes to challenge the
patentability of a patent may do so by filing a petition for inter partes review. This petition
must be filed within nine months following the issuance of that patent.144 However, 35
U.S.C. § 315(b) provides a loophole whereby a defendant in a patent infringement suit
may file a petition for inter partes review at any time within one year after a complaint of
infringement is filed.145
Patents are valid for twenty years from the date of filing.146 Patent holders may sue
for infringement and recover damages for infringing activities that occurred up to six years
prior to the filing of the suit.147 Thus, a patent may be asserted in an infringement action
up to twenty-six years after its initial filing. Tack on the statute of limitations found in 35
U.S.C. § 315(b) and this effectively allows a defendant to challenge the patentability of a
patent grant up to twenty-seven years after it is applied for under a far inferior standard—
preponderance of the evidence—than that provided by an Article III court—clear and
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convincing.
1. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Crafted a Loophole Allowing
Defendants in a Lawsuit to Challenge a Patent under the Inter Partes Review
Process up to Twenty-Seven Years after a Patent Has Been Issued

H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
§ 311(c)(1).
§ 315(b).
§ 154(a)(2).
Id.
§ 271(a).
§ 286.
§§ 271(a), 286.
§ 315(b).
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Congress introduced and passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act under the
guise of making the patent system more efficient at adjudicating patent challenges and
more effective at eliminating bad patents.148 Via the inter partes review process, Congress
gave anyone the opportunity to challenge a patent within nine months of the grant of that
patent.149 Through 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), a defendant in a district court patent infringement
suit is allowed to challenge a patent’s validity in an administrative inter partes review
proceeding up to one year after a defendant is served with a complaint.150 As explained
below, this post-suit loophole affords defendants the ability to challenge the patentability
of a patent at virtually any time during a patent’s life, potentially twenty-seven years after
the patentee applies for the patent.
The USPTO grants patent monopolies for a specified twenty-year term.151 The clock
begins to run from the date on which application is filed, even though a patent may be
issued years after the initial application.152 A lawsuit may be brought at any time for a
cause of action based on infringing activity occurring during the twenty-year term when
the patent is in force.153 Further, suits for patent infringement can recover damages for
infringing activities that took place up to six years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 154
Thus, the holder of a patent grant could theoretically file suit against an infringer for one
day’s worth of damages up to twenty-five years and 364 days after the initial application
for the patent.155 Once the complaint is served on a defendant, that defendant may then
petition for inter partes review up to one year after the service of the complaint.156
Therefore, a defendant in a patent infringement suit may challenge the grant of a patent
approximately twenty-seven years from the time of the patentee’s application for the
patent.
Although it is admittedly unlikely that a patent holder would file suit for one day’s
worth of damages, it is entirely within the realm of possibility. The theoretical possibility
that a patent holder may lose his patent nearly thirty years after making application is the
real logical absurdity.
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2. The Burden of Proof to Support a Finding of Unpatentability in Inter Partes
Review Proceedings Merely Requires a Preponderance of the Evidence as
Opposed to the Higher, Clear and Convincing, Standard Applied by Article
III District Courts

C. The Nobel Biocare Cases Demonstrate the Bizarre Result of Conflating Invalidity
with Unpatentability
As explained above, the USPTO concerns itself with the review of patent
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157. § 316(e).
158. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 447 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
159. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
160. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g
Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)).
161. In re Baxter, Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Unlike the clear and convincing standard required to invalidate a patent in district
courts, inter partes review challenges to the patentability of a patent apply a preponderance
of the evidence standard to the burden of proof. In 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), entitled
“Evidentiary Standards,” it is stated, “[i]n an inter partes review . . . the petitioner shall
have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the
evidence.”157 This much lower standard is directly at odds with the standard in district
courts, a dichotomy that many judges have noticed.
In 1986, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clearly explained, “when the
prior art before the court is the same as that before the USPTO, the burden on the party
asserting invalidity is more difficult to meet.”158 In 2008, the Federal Circuit indicated the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof is “substantially lower” than that of a civil
case brought in district courts.159 In 2011, the Supreme Court in Microsoft showed that
the common-law presumption of validity and the requirement of clear and convincing
evidence “reflected the universal understanding that a preponderance standard of proof
was too ‘dubious’ a basis to deem a patent invalid.”160
In 2012, following the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the Baxter
court in the Federal Circuit cited the Swanson and Microsoft decisions, “illustrat[ing] the
distinction between a reexamination and a district court proceeding.”161 Specifically, the
court noted that challengers that attack the validity of a patent in district court proceedings,
requiring clear and convincing evidence, may fail to prove that a patent is invalid.162
However, the same challenge may indeed be successful in USPTO proceedings due to the
lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence and the lack of the presumption of
validity despite this requirement in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.163 Thus,
unpatentability challenges brought in front of the USPTO demand far less of the challenger
because of the less stringent burdens.
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35 U.S.C. § 101.
§ 102.
§ 103.
§ 101.
§ 311(b).
Id; see also §§ 102, 103.
§ 282(b)(2).
Id; see also §§ 100, 102, 103.
§ 282(b)(2).
§§ 311(b), 102, 103.
§§ 282(b)(2), 100, 102, 103.
§ 316(e).
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 112 (2011).
§ 282(a).
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applications and the issuance of patent grants. Patent grants are awarded when the subject
matter is found to be patentable.164 If a patent’s subject matter falls into any number of
exceptions—such as a lack of novelty,165 the subject matter of the patent is obvious,166
etc.—a patent may be found to be unpatentable by the USPTO before its issuance. 167
Following a patent’s issuance by the USPTO, challengers who believe the USPTO
made a mistake in granting the patent, because the patent’s subject matter falls into one of
the above exceptions, may petition to begin inter partes review proceedings based on a
claim of unpatentability.168 Inter partes review proceedings are limited to challenges “only
on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103,” that is to say, only on the
grounds of lack of novelty or the subject matter of the patent is obvious. 169
On the other hand, a federal district court concentrates on the infringement suit by
the plaintiff and any affirmative defenses raised, such as the defense of invalidity. 170 A
defense of invalidity claims that a patent grant should not have been issued in the first
place by the USPTO.171 A finding of invalidity is based upon the grounds that a patent
lacks novelty, the subject matter is obvious, or any other basis provided for in the LeahySmith America Invents Act.172
Both challenges—unpatentability and invalidity—go to the same issue: whether a
patent should have been granted by the USPTO in the first place. However, unpatentability
only comprises a subset of two types of challenges considered by invalidity,173 whereas
invalidity incorporates the entire universe of possible challenges to the grant of a patent.174
Additionally, unpatentability need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence in
an inter partes review proceeding,175 whereas invalidity must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence in a district court proceeding.176
Based upon historical United States jurisprudence and the edicts of Congress, these
two variations of the challenge, to whether a patent should have been granted by the
USPTO in the first place, make perfect sense. If a patent’s subject matter is evaluated by
the USPTO on a preponderance of the evidence standard and ultimately granted based on
that standard, the subject matter should be reviewable for error under the same
preponderance of the evidence standard. However, Congress established that “[a] patent
shall be presumed valid,”177 and the Supreme Court held the applicable standard to be
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178. Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 102.
179. § 311(c)(1).
180. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018); U.S. Patent No.
8,717,977 (filed Nov. 26, 2012).
181. Nobel Biocare Servs. v. Neodent USA, Inc., No. SACV14-1322-DOC (DFMx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
194460, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014).
182. Id.; To Further Drive Our Business, Instradent Integrates into the Straumann Group, STRAUMANN G RP.,
https://www.straumann.com/group/en/home/our-brands-and-partners/global-brands/instradent.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2019) (Instradent serves as the global distributor of Neodent).
183. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
184. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1).
185. § 315(b).
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read into that statutory language was “clear and convincing.”178 Congress adequately
addressed this conflict in standards by establishing a statute of limitations for inter partes
review under the lower standard to a term of nine months following the grant of the
patent.179 This time-limited review of a granted patent under the lower standard would
seem to conform to the mandates of Congress as they relate to a patent grant, the historical
jurisprudence surrounding a granted patent as property, and the Constitution’s guarantee
of a patent as a right. Unpatentability goes to the correction of a patent issued mistakenly
by the USPTO in the first place, whereas invalidity goes to whether a patentee’s granted
patent should be taken from him because the USPTO made a mistake in granting the patent
in the first place.
However, the time bar loophole identified in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) conflates the
concepts of unpatentability and invalidity. Unpatentability challenges are normally limited
to only nine months after the issuance of a patent grant with the intent of correcting an
error made by the USPTO under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The loophole
allows a defendant in an infringement suit to circumvent the need to raise the affirmative
defense of invalidity under the higher burden of clear and convincing standard and instead
file a petition for inter partes review within one year after receiving notice of the
infringement suit. This effectively allows a defendant to challenge the constitutionally
protected patent at any time while avoiding the congressionally mandated presumption of
validity and the judicially interpreted standard of clear and convincing evidence.
The Nobel Biocare cases demonstrate the bizarre result of conflating invalidity with
unpatentability. Nobel Biocare (Nobel) owns United States Patent 8,714,977 applied for
November 26, 2012 and granted May 6, 2014.180 On September 25, 2014, Nobel filed a
complaint with the ITC.181 On August 19, 2014, Nobel filed an infringement suit against
Neodent.182 On August 20, 2015, Instradent filed a petition for inter partes review.183 This
petition was filed fifteen months and fourteen days after the patent was granted; six months
and fourteen days beyond the statute of limitations for inter partes review,184 but just in
time for the USPTO to grant the petition for inter partes review as a result of the time bar
loophole.185 Had the time bar loophole not existed, Instradent would have been required
to present its affirmative defense of invalidity in district court under the clear and
convincing standard.
Fast forward to July 19, 2017. On that date the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission (ITC) ruling, upholding the validity
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of the ‘977 patent under a clear and convincing standard—the same standard required by
an affirmative defense of invalidity.186 However, because Instradent was allowed to
petition for inter partes review, it was able to challenge the patentability of the ‘977 patent
under the lower standard of preponderance of the evidence. On September 13, 2018, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO’s PTAB ruling. It did so
regarding the same patent, relying on virtually the same evidence, upholding the
unpatentability of the ‘977 patent under a preponderance of the evidence standard.187 Two
separate administrative agencies: one, applying an Article III district court’s burden of
proof, found that the USPTO did not make a mistake in issuing the patent; the other,
applying the lower burden of proof, found that the USPTO did make a mistake in issuing
the patent. This is a bizarre and absurd result flowing from the conflation of unpatentability
and invalidity—two different challenges based on two separate premises with disparate
standards.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS “WITH NARROWLY TAILORED SOLUTIONS”
The director of the USPTO, Andrei Iancu, recently said that “when we do encounter
abuses, we should address them promptly and with narrowly tailored solutions.”188 The
patent system has undergone enormous growing pains in recent history as a result of the
boom of the information age.189 The new inter partes review system has been in place for
more than six years now, practitioners have embraced the changes,190 and parties have
settled into the strategic paths each avenue affords.191
However, not everyone is content with the new normal: In Oil States, a constitutional
challenge was brought against inter partes review.192 Inter partes review withstood the
particular challenges brought against it in that case, but the Supreme Court intimated that
challenges to the proceeding under the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause may

05/15/2020 10:30:18
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186. Instradent USA, Inc. v. ITC, 693 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Motorola Mobility, LLC v. ITC, 737
F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship., 564 U.S. 91, 95).
187. Nobel Biocare Servs. AG, 903 F.3d at 1383.
188. Iancu, Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Inaugural Texas Dinner, supra note 35.
189. Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Trouble Quest for
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2052 (2009) (238,850 in 1998 to 460,000 in 2008); Patent Tech.
Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2019) (589,410 utilitypatent applications in 2015).
190. Salumeh R. Loesch & Jeffrey S. Love, New Patent Challenge Options Under AIA (Aug. 20, 2012);
Zachary Brennan, Generic Drugmakers Embrace Inter Partes Review Process, REG. AFF . PROF’ LS (Sept. 4,
2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/9/generic-drugmakers-embrace-inter-partesreview-pro.
191. ACC America, Offensive and Defensive Strategies for Post Grant Challenges in the Life Sciences (Nov.
14, 2013); Robert M. Asher, Inter Partes Review and Claim Amendment Strategies after Aqua Products, AM .
BAR ASS’N (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/intellectualproperty/practice/2017/inter-partes-review-and-claim-amendment-strategies-after-aqua-products/;
Amending
Claims During Inter Partes Review: Patent Practitioners Beware, JONES DAY (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://www.jonesday.com/Amending-Claims-During-Inter-Partes-Review-Patent-Practitioners-Beware-08-052014/.
192. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018).

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 115 Side B

05/15/2020 10:30:18

WIETHOLTER, J– FINAL FOR P UBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

584

5/14/2020 9:31 AM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:563

be warranted.193 While these challenges may be warranted, if successful they “risk
throwing the baby out with the bathwater,”194 because the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act lacks a severability clause.195
A. A Constitutional Takings Challenge Treats the Symptoms, Not the Source
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193. Id. at 1379.
194. Iancu, Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Inaugural Texas Dinner, supra note 35.
195. 112 CONG. REC. 4,491 (2011) (severability clause offered, without objection, for inclusion within the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and subsequently removed without objection).
196. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365; Complaint, Christy, Inc. v. United States, 2019 U.S. Claims LEXIS 29 (Fed.
Cl. 2018) (No. 18-657 C) (first amended complaint filed July 30, 2018).
197. Complaint, supra note 196, at 27.
198. Id. at 1, 32.
199. Advanced Audio Devices, LLC v. HTC Corp., 139 S. Ct. 334 (2018) (denying Advanced Auto’s writ of
certiorari).
200. Christy, Inc., No. 18-657C, 2019 U.S. Claims LEXIS 29, at *1 (I expect Christy, Inc. will appeal this
dismissal).
201. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379.
202. Complaint, supra note 196, at 1.
203. Wang Lab. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 1998).
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Almost immediately following the Supreme Court’s Oil States invitation to
challenge the inter partes review process under the Takings Clause, Christy, Inc. filed a
class-action complaint against the United States of America on behalf of inventors and
patent owners.196 Christy, Inc. asserted it owned a patent found to be unpatentable by the
USPTO’s PTAB through inter partes review. 197 Christy Inc. contended that the USPTO’s
cancellation of a patent grant as unpatentable constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, and thus, the compensation due to the class members “includes, but is not
limited to, expected royalties and other payments related to use of the patents.”198 Shortly
thereafter, Advanced Audio Devices filed a petition for writ of certiorari on the same issue,
which was denied by the Supreme Court.199 The United States Court of Federal Claims
subsequently dismissed Christy Inc.’s suit for failure to state a claim.200 While both of
these cases attempted to take on the Supreme Court’s invitation in Oil States to challenge
inter partes review under the Takings Clause,201 neither of these lawsuits address the
source of the problem—the erosion of patentee’s rights. Rather, both Christy Inc.’s and
Advanced Audio Devices’ suits attempt to treat the symptoms by going after the
pocketbook of the government.
Christy Inc.’s class action suit addressed multiple symptoms resulting from the
cancellation of a patent grant, which can be categorized in two separate buckets: (1) the
investment necessary to create, apply for, and maintain a patent, and (2) the loss of income
from the licensing and royalty fees. First, the investment itself can include time, money,
and resources expended in developing the underlying inventions of a patent, the attorney’s
fees incurred in prosecuting the patent application and subsequently defending it in a postgrant proceeding, as well as any and all fees paid to the USPTO for the examination and
issuance of the patent.202 Second, the loss of income from licensing and royalty fees is
prospective in nature,203 and if not determined through a settlement between the parties,
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204. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 15, 20 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
205. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
206. Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb 10, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-newdrugs/#7b2dbbbc4a94.
207. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. See Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/; John Powers, The
Short and Long Answers on Patent Applications, BEST LAWYERS (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.bestlawyers.com/article/how-long-does-it-take-to-obtain-a-patent/2065.
210. USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
211. Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261).
212. Josh Malone, $17 Million: The Real and Staggering Cost to Patent in the US in the PTAB Age,
IPWATCHDOG (July 16, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/16/real-staggering-cost-getting-patentptab/id=85639/.
213. Id.
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the damages are often “difficult and expensive” to determine through trial.204 The
combination of these challenges in the form of a Takings Clause class action suit poses
significantly different levels of challenge for courts to answer as a result of the Oil States
decision.
The investment necessary to create a new technology and then obtain and defend a
patent on that technology is wide ranging and difficult to accurately quantify. Justice
Gorsuch in the opening lines of his dissent in Oil States attempts to summarize the
significant investment demanded of patentees in their excursion to obtain a patent grant.
First, there is “much hard work and no little investment” devoted to the creation of
something the inventor believes to be “truly novel.”205 Justice Gorsuch’s non-specific
statement demonstrates the difficulty of quantifying the amount invested in the creation of
an invention. Some companies share research and development cost data, which reveals it
“costs at least $4 billion, and it can be as much as $11 billion” for a pharmaceutical
company to develop a new drug.206 Second, inventors must then “endure the further cost
and effort of applying for a patent.”207 Justice Gorsuch estimates the cost to be $30,000
and the process might take two years,208 which seems to be in line with other industry
estimates, though the amount may vary.209
One component of this process, the fees imposed by the USPTO upon the
prospective patentee, are well-defined in the USPTO’s Fee Schedule.210 These fees are
considered an excise tax because they are “levied upon the acquisition and ownership of .
. . a ‘particular kind’ of personal property” like those the government levies against
community property, gifts, estate assets, etc.211 Thus, at least these taxes will be easy to
evaluate as damages because they are guaranteed to be required of the patentee in the
application and maintenance of his patent.
Once a patent is issued, patentees must then defend their patents against challenges
in post-grant proceedings such as the inter partes review process. 212 These expenses may
never be realized because a post-grant challenge may never materialize, but in the event
that they do, the expenses could rise beyond $17,000,000.213 In contrast to this enormous
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214. My Patent Experience, FRUGALPATENTS, http://frugalpatents.com/?page_id=92 (last visited Jan. 18,
2019).
215. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 15 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
216. Wang Lab. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 1998).
217. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168683 at *46 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013)
(quoting Standard Havens Prods. v. Gencor Indus., 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
218. Id. (quoting Standard Havens Prods. v. Gencor Indus., 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (emphasis
omitted).
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expense and investment, some inventors choose to approach the process solo in an effort
to save money. 214 Consequently, the first bucket of the Christy, Inc. class action suit will
be arduous for a court to quantify, except for the taxes in the form of application and
maintenance fees.
As to the second bucket, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the
amount of lost income as a result of being precluded from seeking licensing and royalty
fees from infringers of a patent that effectively never existed in the first place. Patent
damage trials remain “difficult and expensive,”215 but the court deciding the Christy, Inc.
class action will be faced with determining the amount of money that a patent owner might
have been able to garner through prospective patent licensing.216
Both of these categories of damages under the Takings Clause will be difficult to
determine, but each also introduce a whole host of other questions that must be answered.
For example, if a patent is held to be unpatentable by the PTAB through inter partes
review, it is as if the patent never issued in the first place.217 This would produce odd
results as to both of the categories of damages in the class action suit’s Takings Clause
challenge. As to the first bucket, assume a patentee has invested $100,000 in the patenting
process prior to issuance; following the patent’s issuance, assume the inventor incurred
expenses of $500,000 as a result of maintenance fees, efforts to license the technology,
and defense of the patent against challengers. If a patent is found unpatentable ab initio, is
the patentee entitled to $100,000 for the pre-issuance expenses incurred, $600,000 for all
expenses incurred, or some number in between? If some number in between, then which
expenses should be considered under the Takings Clause? Should the number comprise
only those expenses paid to the USPTO and the expenses paid in defending the patent
against challenges to patentability in front of the USPTO’s PTAB, or should it also include
the expenses incurred by the patentee for seeking to license the patented technology in
reliance on the USPTO’s grant of a valid patent in the first place?
Similar timing issues exist as to the second bucket. For example, assume that the
patent issues and the patentee successfully obtains patent infringement damages in United
States district court in the amount of $1,000,000. Assume further that ten years following
the issuance of the patent, it is found to be unpatentable by the USPTO. In Apple, Inc. v.
Samsung, the court held that because “the patent was void ab initio, . . . damages would
also be precluded.”218 Does that holding apply only as to the litigants in a pre-existing
suit? Does it apply only to litigants in other open or potential future cases involving the
subject patent? Or does that holding apply to preclude all damages obtained subsequent to
the issuance of the subject patent? If the latter version of the holding does not apply, the
defendants in the pre-unpatentability decisions have effectively paid damages in a case
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that had no legal basis originally. If the latter version of the holding does apply, then it
seems the $1,000,000 earned by the patentee must be returned to the defendants because
there was no patent viable for the original suit and subsequent judgment to stand on.
The cause of this confusion stems from the fact that the takings challenge in the
Christy, Inc. class action suit attempts to treat the symptoms, not the source of the problem.
It does however help to reveal the myriad issues that result from the Oil States ruling.219
Beyond the issues previously described, the other most significant issue includes the due
process implication.
B. A Constitutional Due Process Challenge May Be Viable but Might Also Result in the
Elimination of the America Invents Act in Its Entirety
The Supreme Court’s Oil States decision specifically invited another form of
constitutional challenge—due process.220 Due process may indeed provide a viable
challenge to the constitutionality of the inter partes review process under the Mathews v.
Eldridge factors.221 However, this challenge carries along with it a risk of constitutionally
nullifying the entirety of the America Invents Act because the Act does not include a
severability clause.222 This line of attack may prove fruitful, but would risk throwing out
the baby with the bathwater.
1. The Mathews v. Eldridge Factors Indicate the Inter Partes Review Process May
Violate Procedural Due Process Protections
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219. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
220. Id. at 1379; see James Carmichael & Brad Close, Despite Oil States, Inter Partes Review May Still Be
Held Unconstitutional, IPWatchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/despite-oil-states-inter-partesreview-may-still-be-held-unconstitutional/id=96406/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
221. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
222. H.R. REP. N O. 112-98, pt. 1 (2011). 112 CONG. REC. 4,491 (2011) (severability clause offered, without
objection, for inclusion within the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and subsequently removed without
objection).
223. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
224. Id. at 332.
225. U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
226. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
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Mathews v. Eldridge sets out a three-part balancing test for the determination of
whether an administrative procedure provides constitutionally sufficient protection to a
private interest.223 The factors include (1) the private interest affected by official action
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedures would entail.224
As to the first Mathews factor, the private interest affected is a personal property
right in the form of a patent grant. As discussed above, the United States Constitution
provides that a patent is a right,225 various court decisions throughout United States history
have held that a patent grant is a personal property right,226 furthermore, Congress codified
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227. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
229. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2).
230. § 311(c).
231. §§ 141(a), 314(d), 315(b), 318, 319; Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374–75 (2018)
(holding that time-bar determination of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is appealable despite 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)).
232. § 282(a).
233. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
234. § 316(e).
235. See supra notes 151–56 and accompanying text.
236. Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., 817 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But cf. Achates
Reference Publ., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 655 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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the importance of the property rights afforded to the patent grant in the Patent Act of
1952227 and affirmed those rights in the 2012 passage of the America Invents Act.228
As to the second Mathews factor, Congress in its creation of the America Invents
Act attempted to safeguard against erroneous deprivation of the private interest at stake
through their implementation of explicit estoppel rules,229 statute of limitations in which
petitions for inter partes review may be made,230 and the right to appeal from a final
written decision by the USPTO’s PTAB—an Article I administrative agency—to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—an Article III appellate court.231 However, each of
these safeguards fails to adequately protect the private interest at stake because their
probable value is limited by the standard of proof applicable to the underlying proceeding.
Congress commanded that an issued patent “shall be presumed valid,”232 and the
United States Supreme Court held this statutory language requires a showing of invalidity
of a patent by clear and convincing evidence.233 Thus, the proper standard of proof to be
applied to the evaluation of an issued patent should be the clear and convincing standard.
However, inter partes review only requires a showing of unpatentability according to a
preponderance of the evidence standard.234 Thus, any estoppel provisions, statute of
limitations, and right to appeal are hamstrung by the required application of this lower
standard.
Furthermore, the failure of these safeguards is intensified by the time bar loophole
inherent in Congress’ design of the America Invents Act. As discussed above, this
loophole presents defendants with the ability to challenge the granting of a patent in inter
partes review proceedings up to twenty-seven years after the patent’s issuance.235 Thus, a
defendant in an infringement lawsuit may challenge the patentability of a patent under a
preponderance of the evidence standard even after the patent has expired. Even more, the
Federal Circuit holds that “[it] lack[s] jurisdiction to review ‘the Board’s determination to
initiate IPR proceedings based on its assessment of the time-bar of § 315(b), even if such
assessment is reconsidered during the merits phase of proceedings and restated as part of
the Board’s final written decision.’”236 Consequently, even if a defendant fails to file a
petition within the time limit specified in § 315(b), the USPTO may nonetheless institute
IPR without fear of review. This further exacerbates the failure of these safeguards by
leaving the patent holder with limited recourse. If this is true, can a patent every truly vest
as a personal property right in the inventor carrying with it the greater protections afforded
to it by Congress and the United States Supreme Court in the form of adjudication in front
of an Article III court, applying the clear and convincing standard, or trial by jury?
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This Mathews factor is severely deficient in its protections of the private interest at
stake. Even if the procedural safeguards currently in place would normally safeguard the
private interest at stake, the inferior burden of proof employed by these so-called
safeguards certainly leads to an erroneous deprivation of the private interest at stake when
compared with the standards decreed by Congress and enforced by the United States
Supreme Court. Moreover, the time bar loophole exacerbates the harm done by allowing
a challenger to take advantage of the lower burden of proof at virtually any time, in clear
contravention of the nine-month statute of limitations, and without the benefit of review
by an Article III court.
The third factor, the government’s interest, seems to be of no consequence in this
instance because there are additional or substitute procedures in place which would not
require undue fiscal and administrative burdens. The government’s interest is in
“securing” the “exclusive Rights” to patent holders and then protecting those rights in
accordance with the Constitution, Congress’ legislative intent, the USPTO’s mission, and
judicial precedent.237 As a result, the government already has procedures in place in the
form of the United States District Court system which is capable of handling such disputes
without undue fiscal and administrative burdens just as it has throughout its history.
2. The America Invents Act May Be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny and Susceptible
to Complete Nullification If Constitutional Challenges Are Effective
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237. See supra Part II.A and notes 38–43 and accompanying text; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; About Us,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
238. Mass. Bd. of Ret.v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976).
239. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005).
240. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936) (holding in the absence of a severability clause, “the
presumption is that the legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety”).
241. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 488 (1995).
242. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983).

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 118 Side A

If pursued, this constitutional due process challenge may result in a scenario in
which the entire America Invents Act could be nullified. The United States Supreme Court
previously explained that “[i]f a statute invades a ‘fundamental’ right . . . it is subject to
strict scrutiny.”238 In a separate case, the Supreme Court held that “property is a natural,
fundamental right.”239 Thus, the America Invents Acts may be subject to strict scrutiny if
a constitutional due process challenge is brought under the Mathews v. Eldridge
framework.
If a statute fails to include a severability clause, the Supreme Court may hold the
entirety of the law unconstitutional even if only one part is unconstitutional.240 The
Supreme Court has held that if Congress merely fails to include a severability clause, the
Court will consider one to be implied.241 However, when Congress intentionally removes
a particular provision prior to enactment, “it may be presumed that the limitation was not
intended.”242 In the Congressional Record leading up to the passage of the America
Invents Act, Congress did not merely make an oversight by forgetting to include a
severability clause. Instead, a severability clause was offered without objection and
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subsequently removed without objection.243 Therefore, the America Invents Act may be
susceptible to complete nullification if a constitutional challenge as to one part of it is
effective.
C. The Director’s Rulemaking Authority Provides a Limited Avenue to Address the Issue
The USPTO is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act because it is an
administrative agency within the executive branch of government.244 The Administrative
Procedure Act affords administrative agencies the ability to propose and prescribe rules.245
Congress imbued the Director of the USPTO with the authority to “prescrib[e] regulations
under this section,” taking into account the “integrity of the patent system,” and “the
efficient administration of the Office.”246
However, the USPTO Director’s hands are tied. When “Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue,” and its “intent . . . is clear, that is the end of the
matter.”247 Congress has spoken directly about the precise issues of: (1) the time bar
loophole,248 and (2) the lower burden of proof.249 Thus, the court and the agency “must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”250 While the Director of
the USPTO may be able to address other issues that lead to uncertainty in the patent
system, on this issue he is powerless.
V. CONCLUSION

112 CONG. REC. 4, 491 (2011).
5 U.S.C. § 551.
Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B).
§ 316(b).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
§ 315(b).
§ 316(e).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
§ 315(b).

05/15/2020 10:30:18

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 118 Side B

Congress’ 2012 change to the patent system doomed patent litigation to produce
absurd results that ensure patent rights are never truly vested in the owner. The only
guarantees afforded to the owner of a patent include the payment of excise taxes in the
form of application and maintenance fees, and that his patent property rights will be
stripped from him in front of an administrative agency, applying a low burden of proof,
without the right to a trial by jury. As identified by this Comment, a loophole exists in the
statutory design of the America Invents Act. This loophole allows defendants in patent
infringement suits to avoid Article III courts and the protections afforded to patents by the
higher burden of proof. Instead, defendants may choose to file a petition with an
administrative agency, availing themselves of a much more lax burden of proof, at any
time during a patent’s life and beyond. In effect, this loop hole forces the Article III
judiciary to bow to the power of an Article I administrative agency.
I propose that Congress eliminate the time bar loophole found in 35 U.S.C. §
315(b).251 This narrowly tailored solution would harmonize the holding in Oil States—
that inter partes review and thus, the lower burden of proof utilized in those proceedings

C M
Y K

42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 119 Side A

05/15/2020 10:30:18

WIETHOLTER, J– FINAL FOR P UBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

DEATH AND TAXES

5/14/2020 9:31 AM

591

is constitutional252—with the currently conflicting provisions of the America Invents Act
which mandate issued patents be presumed valid.253 Additionally, this solution will
mitigate one source of potential constitutional challenge to the America Invents Act as
invited by the Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States.254 Finally, this solution increases
the reliability of the United States’ patent system by providing patent owners and the
public with a clearer guarantee of their constitutionally protected rights.
- Jason Wietholter*†
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252. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018).
253. § 282(a).
254. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379.
* Jason Wietholter is a J.D. candidate at The University of Tulsa College of Law. During his time at The
University of Tulsa College of Law, he served as Executive IT Editor of the Tulsa Law Review and President
of the Board of Advocates. The author would like to thank his wife, Amanda, for her patience, love, and
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† Following the editing of this note, but prior to its publication, the United States Supreme Court decided Thryv,
Inc. v. Click-To-Call Techs., LP, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2406 (Apr. 20, 2020). The Court held 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)
prevents Article III review of the USPTO's decision to institute inter partes review, even when the petitioner
exceeds the one-year statute of limitations found in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). This holding further exacerbates the
impacts of the time bar loophole by denying patent owners recourse even when a fundamental, procedural legal
protection is violated.

